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It\ TllE SUPRHiE COURT
OF THE: STATE OF UTAH

S. H. BE:NNION,

vs.
GULF OIL CORPORATION, a
Penns}lvania Corporation and
tne U'rAH STA'l'E BOARD OF OIL,
GAS AND
an agency of
the State of Utah,

Case No. 19144

Defendants/Respondents

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
The three issues presented in this petition ior
ienearing are:
1.

Whether the court was misled by Plaintitf-Appellant
into believing that the Board's Order was foundeo
upon facts that, in truth, were irrelevant and
extraneous to the roatter before the Board ana, as
such, were unconsidered by the Board in arriving at
the decision under review.

2.

Whether the Court misapprehended the Board's
ir1ter1Jretation of, and its express intention to
rel:; upon, the operative statute.

3.

Whether the Court overlooked important Utah case
la1' which establishes the standard of review to be
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(R. 199.)

During the examination of Mr. Anthony regarding

this Voda #2 well the following exchange took place:
MR. CHAIRMAN: You don't even know
if it is going to be a commercial
well?
MR. ANTHONY: No, we don't know
that. The only thing we do know is
that it was making approximately 60
barrels of oil. We have no idea of
what the extent of the reservoir
is. We can't know at this time.
we realize that this whole field
is--apparently the reservoir due to
the geological structure of the
thing--it's almost impossible to
determine what's going to happen
from one well to the next as far as
correlating sands ana production.
(Reply Brief, p. 10, Slip Op. at 4,
R. 203-4, attached.)
In Bennion's Reply Brief, this quote was taken out of
the context of the transcript from the April 30, 1981 hearing and
held out as describing the Albert Smith #2.
misstatement.

This was a critical

Gulf had previously established the fact of

commercial production for the Smith #2 with Mr. Anthony's earlier
testimony.

(R. 196.)

As a result of this hearing, the Board

granted Gulf's uncontested request to designate the Smith 12 as
the unit well.

The Board took no action to redesignate the Voda

#2 as the unit well for its respective drilling unit.
There were two more hearings in Cause No. 139-20(B)
occurring on September 24, 1981 and October 22, 1981.

The status

of the Smith i2 as the unit well did not arise during these
hearings.

-4-

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In the instant case, this Court, in apparent reliance
upon the misstatement by Plaintiff-Appellant that the Smith #2
well was a poorly producing well, erred in determining that the
Board of Oil, Gas and Mining acted in an arbitrary and capricious
manner in designating the Smith #2 as the one permitted
production well for the drilling unit.

In fact, testimony

introduced to the Board and supported by production records
established the Smith #2 well as a highly productive well.

The

quote appearing on page 10 of Plaintiff-Appellant's Reply Brief
and again on page 4 of this Court's opinion in this matter is
taken directly from testimony regarding the Josephine Voda i219C5 well, a marginally productive well unrelated to the matter
betore this Court.

(R. 203.)

Furthermore this Court, apparently unaware of the
Board's Order in Cause No. 139-20 (R. 6), erroneously concluded
that the broad declaration of public interest contained in Utah
Code Ann.

§

40-6-1 was the sole authority upon which the Board

relied in designating the Smith #2 as the unit well.

In fact,

the order in this Cause is replete with statutory support for the
Board's action.
Finally, a great degree of deference must be afforded
the Board's findings of basic fact and its construction of its
operative statute.

If there is any basis in reason for a

statutory interpretation and any substantive evidence whatsoever
to support a finding of fact, the Board's order must be
sustained.

-5-
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Nos. 139-20 anci 139-20(bl.

IN APPAAl::NT l<f.LIAJ;CE. UPOI; FACTS
INCIDEt;T TO AN EXTRA!,EOUS ISSUI::,
THE COURT INCOR]{ECTLY CONCLUDED
THAT THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 'I'HE BOARD'S
ORDER DESIGNATING THE SECOND WELL
AS THE PRODUCTIOt' WELL

In the course of the April 30, 1981
Board,

hearing betore the

the status ot 1...1>'.Q test wells was discussed,
i2-8C5 anu the Josephine Voaa #2-19C5.

the Albert

It is critical to

the installt case that the Court correctly 1-'erceive that the
evioence betore the Boaru

Oil

30, 1981

revealed that the

Smith 12 1.;as an overwhelr;ungly gooo producer.

The Srni th

2

prouuc:eu 16 ,238 barrels ot oil, 16 ,977 rnc:t ot gas alld 600 barrels
u1

( R.

watu
16 9. J

uc.tlthJ 46 aa:,s ot

testing in January anu February, 1981.

The Sr .. 1th fl prouuceo 1,458 barrels ot oil, 2,729 rncc

of gas ana 17,851 barrels of water curing 58 days of prociuct1on
in the 11rst twc

ot 1981.

which sL:ppurt the Euara' s oec1s1or, to re-cies1g1Jate the Src1ith it2
as the pruuuc·t1un we1l tor
Boar a in April

gas than tht.

Gl
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air,t1ft-Ap!Jellant' s Reply Brief.

It was unknown at

time of the Aµr il hearing if that well would be a commercial

t

l1t'

f

L<'uucer as il hau pruouceci only 60 barrels of oil in an initial

11-hour test.
Al though the stateruent a!Jpertaining to the perplexing
characteristics of the reservoir geology is applicable to all
u11lling endeavors in the Altamont Bluebell fiela,

the facts

incident to the poor initial proauction is specific to the
Josephine Voda #2.

As a result of this out-of-context quote, the

Court found that there was no economic justification for the
Board's action.
fctcts,

Based upon the detection of these misapplied

the Board urges the Court to reconsider its conclusion on

tli1s issue, grant this petition for rehearing and affirm the
Boara's oraer designating the Smith i2 as the unit production
wll l.
POINT II

THE COURT, IN CONCLUDING THAT THE
BOARD FOUNDED ITS ORDER SOLJ::LY UPON
ONE SUBSECTION OF THE OPERATIVE
STATUTE, APPARENTLY OVERLOOKED THE
EXTENSIVE STATUTORY AUTHORITY CITED
IN THE BOARD'S ORDER IN CAUSE NO.
139-20
There are three orders ot the Board in this matter, all
,_,t

which are attached to Plaintiff-Appellant's Complaint filea

with the trial court.

(R. 6-21.)

The tirst orcier, 139-20, was

as a result ot the September 25, 1980 emergency Board
r1.:,i:1rir1c;.

This hearing was pror11ptea by questions regarding

, LatuLurj authority hypothesized to the Board by the Third
i "

"t 1 i

c t

cu u 1 t

i r 1c'

i a enc t o a r,w t i on t or a pr el i mi na r y in J un ct ion
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filed by Plaintiff-Appellant against the drilling of the Sr.iith

i2.
In response to the District Court, the Board
interpreted several portions of the relevant statute which it is
empowered to administer by citing and underscoring what, in the
Board's view, were the pivotal phrases.

Two critical

subsections, §§ 40-6-6(c) and (d), were expressly included as
confirming the Board's authority to authorize the drilling of
infill test wells.
This Court has apparently overlooked this first order
of the Board as illustrated by its observation that "[tlhe
Board's order in the instant case did not purport to comply with
!Utah Code Ann. §40-6-6Cdll."

(Slip op. at 3l.

In fact, the

Board clearly complied with its interpretation of the cited
section that only one well per unit may
any given time.

oil and gas at

This is a practical interpretation born of the

knowledge that any other characterization would preclude the
accepted and widespread practice of drilling subsequent unit
wells in cases of an initial dry hole or as a result of the
plugging and abandonment of the initial well due to depletion.
The statutory "uniform plan" language emphasized by the Court for
such additional wells as the Board deems necessary does not
preclude the Board from instituting such a plan gradually.

This

well was but the first step in the Board's stated goal of
recovering more of the heretofore unrecoverable oil and gas in
the reservoir.

(R. 8, 9.)

-8-

The statutory foundation tor administrative action was
precisely set out in the declaratory-type Board ruling in reply
to the District Court's inquiry.

The Board therefore urges this

Court to reconsider its holding in this case, grant the petition
for rehearing and affirm the Board's orders in this matter.
POINT III
THIS COURT HAS OVERLOOKED OR
MISAPPREHENDED IMPORTANT UTAH CASE
LAW WHICH ESTABLISHES THE STANDARD
OF REVIEW TO BE AFFORDED TO ORDERS
OF THE BOARD OF OIL, GAS AND MINING
In Bennion v. Shell, 675 P.2d 1135 {Utah 1983), this
Court held that the separate standards of review enunciated in
of Aciroinistrative Services v. Public Service
Corrunission, 658 P.2d 601, 607-12 {Utah 1983) are "applicable to
district court review of the decisions of the Board."

fillitl..l, above at 1140.

Bennion v.

In Bennion, this Court went on to adopt

the rule that "no presumption of correctness" would be afforded
to the district court's aecision but that this Court would review
the decision of the Board "just as if the appeal had come
directly from the agency."

Bennion v. Shell, above at 1140.

There are two levels of review set out in the
Aarninistrative Services case which are applicable to the instant
case.

First, Board findings on questions of basic fact should be

afforded the "greatest degree of deference" and should be
affirmed it they are supported by "evidence of any substance
whatever".

Admin. Serv. at 609.

Second, the application of

these findings on questions of basic fact to the law of the case
and the Boara's interpretations of the "operative provisions of

-9-

the statutory law it is empowered to administer" fall within the
category of the reasonableness of the order.

Id at 610.

Great

weight is to be given to Board conclusions on matters in this
second classification and its decision set aside "only if it is
outside 'the tolerable limits of reason.'"

Id at 612, quoting

Silver Beehive Telephone Co. v. Public Service Conunission, 30
Utah 2d 44, 512 P.2d 1327 (1973).
The Board's underlying finding of basic fact following
the April 30, 1981 hearing that the Smith #2 is capable of
producing substantially more oil and gas than the Smith #1 is a
finding supported by testimony in connection with completion and
testing data (R. 196-97) and production records for the two wells
for January and February, 1981.

As a result of this substantive

evidence, the Board finding regarding the production status of
the two Smith wells should be affirmed.
Although Court review of findings of basic fact are at
issue, the primary matter of concern is the level of review that
has been applied to the Board's interpretation of the "operative
provisions of the statutory law it is empowered to administer".
(Admin. Serv., above at 610.)

Nowhere in that order does the

Board attempt to characterize general law.

Each statutory

section cited is drawn from the law incident to the regulation 0£
oil and gas.

These interpretations are certainly within "the

tolerable limits of reason," Acimin. Serv. at 612 citing
Beehive Telephone Co. v. Public Service Comrn'n, above, and the
Board's conclusions deserve affirmance by this Court.

-10-

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing discussion, it appears that
the Court misapprehended certain facts and either misapprehended
or overlooked significant case law in determining that the
Board's order lacked evidentiary and statutory support.
Therefore, this petition for rehearing should be granted and the
orders of the Board in Cause Nos. 139-20 and 139-20(B) affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this

IC""-

day of September,

19 85.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

;JJrlrtt!Uv.>f21uiV

BARBARA W. ROBERTS
Assistant Attorney General
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day of
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to:
Reid Tateoka
McKay, Burton, Thurman and Condie
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
500 Kennecott Building
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Hugh C. Garner
Attorney at Law
310 South Main Street, #1400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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CALISE:
I

Two

J.

The Board has jurisdiction over the matter

in

dispute pursuant to

the Oil and Gas Conservation Act, Section 40-6-1 et seq., U.C.A., 19S3.
2.

The Boa.rd has authority to issue an emergency order in this matter

pursuant to Section 40-6-S(c), U.C.A., 1953, which provides:
When an emergency requiring immediate action is found
bv the Commission to exist, it is authon::ed to issue an
order 1r-·1thout notice or hearing, which shall be
effective upon promulgation, provided that no such order
remain effective for more than fifteen (15) days.
3.

Jn th.Jt the: Third Judicial District Court has been requested to

enjoin the .orcrat1on of Gulf's Albert Smith 2-8CS .,..ell and has continued such
proccedinp until the Board rules on this matter at the September 25, 1980
Board He3ring, the Board finds that an emergency situation exists requiring
immediate admir.istratl\'e action nnd therefore issues the following Findings
of Fact, Cone 1 us ions of La"l<I· and Order.

1.

On $C'ptembcr 20, 19-2, the Bo:ird entered an Order in Cause No. 139-8

spacrng the }OC3tion anJ drilling of wells 0n 640 acre u:iits in the Altamont
!Huebcll Field, Duchesne County, Utah, and requiring "that no more than one
\.'ell shall he drilled on any such unit for the production of oil, gas and
associated hydrocarbons from the common source of supply ... "
2.

On AuJ:lJSt :?S, 1980, the D1nsion granted approval to Gulf to drill

the Albert s-.ith 2-SCS as an infill test .,.·ell located within the area spaced
under the Order issued in (.'.lu:::.e No. 139-8.

The above said 1o;ell was approved

a.::; a 60-day test drilling well and the Division's letter disallo.,..ed simultaneous
production of thC' tc<;t well and the Albert Sf'lith

well which is presently

under production, heyond the period of testing allowed by the Dnision.
3.

On Scrtcmher 2, 1980, the DHis1on received a letter from Peter

Stirb:i on bch.1tf of h1s client

s.

H. Benn1on, a non-consenting land owner

in this rn-ittcr, requesting th<? Dnision to take action pursuant to 40-6-9(c),
U.C.A., 1953, w1th1n 10 dnys of rccc1pt of the letter to enjoin the dnll1ng
of Gulf 1 s "lhcrt 5:-:nth 2-RC.S ...·ell as being in violat10n of the Board's
orJ".'r
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s. H. Bennion,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.
Gulf Oil Corporation, a Pennsylvania
Corporation and the Utah State Board
of Oil, Gas & Mining, an agency of
the State of Utah,
Defendants and Respondents.

F I L ED

Auq..:st 19, 1985
Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk

HOWE, Justice:
Appellant

s.

H. Bennion appeals from a su:mmary

.

j udg::-.ent granted in favor of respondents Gulf oil Corporation

and the Utah State Board of oil Gas
reversal of the judgment and
his favor should have been granted.

and Mining. He seeks
that sur..=.ary judgment in

Bennion holds mineral interests which without his
consent were made part of an oil drilling unit
by
the Board, as permitted by the Oil and Gas conservation Act,
U.C.A., 1953, §§ 40-6-1 to -19 (198l). By a 1972 orde: of the
Board, Gulf was the producer authorized to drill the single
production well allowed on the 640-acre unit. As a
no:-,consenting interest owner, Bennion was entitled under the
act to his proportionate share of the oil and gas produced
from the unit minus his proportionate share of the cost of
drilling, production, and maintenance.
Gulf drilled a producing well on the 640-acre.unit
and recouped its drilling costs.
Bennion was thus entitled to
receive and in fact was receiving his proportionate :hare of_
the oil and gas produced on the unit minus the r:latively low
cost of oroduction and maintenance. Witbout notice or
hearing,· but with pen;,ission given by a staff engineer
the
Division of Oil, Gas, and Mining on August 25, 19BO,
"th"
drilling a second well as an infill test wel.
the 640-acre unit.
Bennion petitioned the Board
f e
drilling on the basis that a second well was in vio.a ion
the Oil and Gas Conservation Act and the Board's
of
unitization order. The Board determined that
a second
well as . a test well . was not in violation
.i was
,
Bennion
orcer and that, inasmuch as it was a test we 11 '
ver the
not required to pay any of its drilling costs.
ll as a
Ecard added that if it were to redesignate the.te:
his
well, Bennion would then be responsibl Gulf "shut
proportionate share of those costs.
11
l_n" the first well and applied to have the secon we

°

°

designated as the production well. After a hearing, the Board
changed the designation of the second well from a test well to
that of the unit's production well and ordered Bennion to pay
his share of the $1.4 million drilling cost.
Bennion appealed
the Board's order to the district court.
Pursuant to U.C.A., 1953, § 40-6-lO(b), appellant was
entitled on his appeal to a determination of the "issues on
both questions of law and fact" by the district court. on the
parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, the court
determined from the transcript of the hearing before the Board
that the Board had acted properly and within its authority.
sur..:nary judgi;ient in favor of Gulf was entered.
For purposes of this opinion, we shall assume that
the Oil and Gas Conservation Act allows a staff engineer to
authorize the drilling of a test well on a producing unit. We
note that the issue is raised, but not argued, in the briefs
of counsel and that the act is not clear on the issue. See
U.C.A., 1953, § 40-6-3. However, even assuming that
statute allows such a delegation of authority, we cannot agree
with the district court's
of the Board's order
redesignating the test well as the production well and holding
Bennion responsible for a proportionate share of the cost of
drilling the second well.
Although the Oil and Gas Conservation Act was first
enacted in 1955, we have had little opportunity to construe
its provisions. A cursory reading of the act discloses,
however, that in at least two places it is contemplated that
only one well should be drilled per unit.
For example,
section 40-6-6(b) provides:
In establishing a drilling unit, the
acreage to be embraced within each unit
and the shape thereof shall be determined
by the board from the evidence introduced
at the hearing but shall not be
nor greater than the maximum area that can
be efficiently and economically drained .ey
one well.
(Emphasis added.)

Subsection (c) provides:

subject to the provisions of this act, the
order establishing drilling units shall
direct that no more than one well shall be
drilled for production from
colTll!1on
source of supply on any unit . . . .
(Emphasis added.)
We find nothing in the act which expressly
allows a test well to displace the production well from a
COlllll\On source of supply on the unit. The only reference to
the drilling of additional wells is found in subsection (d)
where it is provided:
Ho. 19144
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When found necessary for the prevention of
waste, or to avoid the drilling of
unnecessary wells, or to protect
correlative rights, an order establishing
drilling units in a pool may be modified
by the board to increase the size of
drilling units in the pool or any zone
thereof, to decrease the size of drilling
units or to permit the drilling of
additional wells on a reasonably uniform
plan in the pool, or any zone thereof.
The Board's order in the instant case did not purport to
comply with this subsection. The order did not authorize the
drilling of additional wells on a uniform plan "in the pool or
any zone thereof."
The Board made its order approving. the second well as
the production well for the unit and charging Bennion for his
proportionate share of the cost of drilling in reliance on
section 40-6-1, which is entitled "Declaration of Public
Interest:"
It is declared to be in the public
interest to foster, encourage, and promote
the development, production, and
utilization of natural resources of oil
and gas in the state of Utah in such a
manner as will prevent waste; to authorize
and to provide for the operation and
development of oil and gas properties in
such a manner that a greater ultimate
recovery of oil and gas may be obtained
and that the correlative rights of all
owners be fully protected; to encourage,
authcrize, and provide for voluntary
agreements for cycling, recycling,
pressure maintenance, and secondary
recovery operations in order that the
greatest possible economic recovery of oil
and gas may be obtained within the state
the end that the land owners, the
royalty owners, the producers, and the
general public may realize and enjoy the
greatest possible good from these vital
natural resources.
The Board further justified its action on its finding that the
first well at the time it was shut in was at the point of
r:arginal recovery of further oil or gas or both of them. At
the hearing before the Board, Gulf introduced production .
reoorts of the second well for the first three months of its
operation which showed higher production than the first well.
!jo·.·ever, Gulf qid not know if the second well would be a
3
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co:::nr.iercial well or even if its total production would exceed
that which would still be produced by the first well.
Gulf's
expert witness testified:
We have no idea of what the extent of the
reservoir is. We can't know that at this
time. We realize that this whole field
is--apparently the reservoir due to the
geological structure of the thing--it's
almost impossible to determine what's
going to happen from one well to the next
as far as correlating sands and production.
We acknowledge the legislative mandate in section
40-6-1 to promote the development of our state's oil and gas
res0urces. We do not believe, however, that the broad
declaration of public interest contained therein was meant to
override the specific statutory restrictions on the drilling o:
an additional well on any unit.l Y,oreover, we note that the
declaration of public interest calls for "the greatest possible
economic recovery of oil and
which provides the basis fc:
Bennion's complaint that the evidence is lacking as to whether
the second well will ever pay out. We also note the legislative intent expressed in section 40-6-6(a) that the drilling
of unnecessary wells be avoided.
Thus, aside from the fact
that there does not appear to be any statutory authority for
the action of the Board, the evidence was insufficient to
demonstrate that it was more equitable or reasonable to shut in
the first well and redesignate the second well as the production well.
More importantly, the evidence fails to justify
the trampling of a nonconsenting mineral interest owner's
correlative rights in charging him with the added and
speculative expense of drilling the second well.
We have examined Gulf's res judicata defense and fine
it to be without merit.
The Board erred in its redesicrnation of the second
well as the production well for the unit, and the district
court erred in affirming the Board's order. We vacate the
Board's order in cause number 139-20(8) and
the cause tc
the Board with the instruction to enter an order that the
second well is and has been producing in violation of u.c.A.,
1953, § 40-6-6(e) and relieve Bennion of all obligation to
share in the cost of drilling.

1.
In 1983, two years after the hearing be:cre the Board in
the instant case, extensive amendments were rnade to the Oil
and Gas Conservation Act.
Properly, we have not considered
them in our analysis and decision.
No. 19144
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Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice

Christine M. Durham, Justice

Michael D. Zinunennan, Justice
Stewart, Justice, concurs in the result.
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